Just a few notes:
First, I am NOT a USCG rated captain.
2nd, while Ray McCormack was “out there, doing it”, we were safely anchored in Turtle Bay, not too far from MVWeebles, so I guess that makes us wimps . . . BUT we had successfully come down from PNW in our boat, and even though the entrance to the bay was wide open, we made the conscious decision NOT to enter Turtle Bay in the dark. We scheduled our departure from Ensenada, and modified our enroute speeds in order to arrive off of Turtle Bay (and NOT by following the 10 meter contour) after daybreak.
Ray McCormack reported the winds at the time of the sinking to be at least 20 kts . . . My anemometer only recorded 12kts max gusts overnight . . . . Due to the sinking, Ray McCormack lost his laptop. BBG owner, trusting to the experience of this USCG captain, lost everything she owned.
On his current delivery.
Ray is on record as stating that his fuel burn rates were done WITHOUT all the additional fuel he was planning on taking on the Hawaii delivery.
He appears to have actually loaded three 500 gallon bladders, one in the boat garage, and two down below, which coincidentally prevents access to the engine spaces until sufficient fuel is burned off (at least 500 gallons) to allow one of the bladders to be moved out of the way in order to allow access to the engine spaces . . . . In addition he stated he was planning on carrying 7-8 poly drums on the aft deck for additional fuel. So by my figuring, he had the capability of loading 1885 tp 1940 gallons of diesel fuel, above and beyond the installed tankage. Weight of 1885 gallons of fuel plus the bladders, poly drums, pumps, lashing etc, would approach 14,000 lbs of fuel and associated equipment, above and beyond what the boat was designed for.
So, since the engine spaces were inaccessible initially, assuming his 5 gallon burn rate is accurate, then he PLANNED for not being able to access the engine spaces for the first 100 hours of the trip, over FOUR DAYS. This after the previous voyage was cancelled because of a leak in the engine spaces, which necessitated returning to port because not only could he not address the leak because he could not even access the engine spaces, he had no way of knowing how serious the leak even was due to the extra fuel blocking access to the engine spaces . . . . We do engine checks every hour. Not looking at, or even being able to access the ER spaces for the first four days of a trip would be totally a non-starter for us.
There is also the Nov/Dec delivery of a Jefferson 54 from PNW to Socal in 2022. He didn’t make it any further than Cape Flattery. He lost the main anchor, with 400’ of chain, because he neglected to secure it to the deck prior to departure. Then he returned to Neah Bay, attempted to tie up at a dock, because well, he no longer had an anchor. When told he couldn’t tie up there, he left, and on attempting to leave the harbor, apparently ran into a moored log boom, doing extensive damage to the props/shafts/rudders. He limped into Port Angles, abandoning the boat because it was “broken”. Estimates of repair I heard were close to $100,000 usd. . . .
He currently has had to divert further South than apparently planned due to adverse WX. I am not convinced he had sufficient fuel for the trip, even with perfect sea conditions. Given the conditions he is encountering, I don't think he has enough fuel to make it to Hilo. Putting people at risk to save his . . . well, to assist him from the consequences of his actions is unconscionable. Yet, his history of being towed in by the USCG seems to point to this being just another part of a successful Ray McCormack delivery.
Yep, not JUST a delivery captain . . .
